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R E P 0 R T 
on 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SURINAME RELATING TO HUMAN RIGHTS 
This is a report concerning the human rights situation in 
Suriname, based upon a mission tc that country carried out between 
3 and 17 February 1981. 
February 1981. 
The facts herein reported are as of 17 
Suriname is situated on the northeast coast of South America. A 
former Dutch colony, it received its independence in 1975. Suriname 
has a typically Caribbean population and culture, deriving from a 
former plantation economy which required the importation of its 
labour supply first in the form of African slaves, later of 
Hindustani and Javanese contract labourers. These, tcgether with 
the descendants of European and Jewish planters, farmers, soldiers 
and administratcrs (all of whom inter-married, or at least interbred, 
with the local population), and also Chinese and Lebanese mer-
chants, American Indians, and Bush Negroes (descendants of escaped 
slaves), and others, go tc make up an extraordinarily kaleidoscopic 
and relatively well-integrated population of about half a million, of 
whom almost a third have emigrated tc the Netherlands in recent 
years. ( l) 
(l) For the social and political history of Suriname see R. van Lier, 
Samenleving in een Grensgebied (1977), and E. Dew, The Difficult 
Flowering of Suriname (1978). 
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Introduction: Background of the Mission 
On 25 Fe bruary 1980 the constitutionally establishe d government 
of Suriname was set aside in an almost b lood-free coup d'etat 
carried out by a small group of non-commissioned officers, who 
shortly thereafter organised themselves into the Nationale Militaire 
Raad (National Military Council - NMR). The President of the 
Republic was allowed to remain in office, and the parliament was 
not suspended; some weeks after the coup, 
ment was organised. In the meantime a 
political figures from the preceding regime 
detained by the NMR on charges of corruption. 
a new civilian govern-
number of prominent 
had been arrested and 
I n May an alleged counter- coup attempt (the "Ormskerk coup") 
was foiled, the leading figure killed, and a number of others 
arrested. 
I n June those in detention were turned over to civilian authori-
ties and apparently most of them were provisionally released from 
custody. 
In July the Human Rights Committee established under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights met to consider 
the report of Suriname, which was, however, based on the situation 
before 25 February. The events since the coup and the process of 
·normalisation were extensively discussed and Suriname' s position, as 
expounded by its representative, Professor L. Th. Waaldijk, received 
a distinctly sympathetic reception. The member:;; of the Committee 
did express their concern with regard to the intention of the 
Suriname authorities to institute a special tribunal to deal with 
alleged corruption in the previous regime, and especially with 
regard to the retro-activity and vagueness of the proposed definition 
of corruption. At the time, the draft decree in question provided 
only for civil remedies (recoupment of ill-gotten gains, compensation 
for material damage to the state, and civil fines ) . 
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On l3 August a s econd alle ged coup involving three members of 
the NMR itself and a number of civilians (the "left coup") was 
nipped in the bud ·and those sup posedly invol ved were ·arrested . 
The same day, the President a nd the existing civilian government 
resigned, turning the government over to the military authorities. 
These proclaimed a state of emergency, suspended the constitution , 
and disbanded the parliament. (See Algemeen Decreet A, and Alg. 
Deer. A-1 , 13- 8- 80) Governmental powers, since then , have been 
jointly exercised by the civilian authorities appointed by the mili-
tary (a Council of Ministers, under President drs . H.R. Chin A Sen), 
the commanding officers of the army ( "het Militair Gezag"), and the 
NMR. (See Alg. Deer. A and A-1; Alg . Deer. B-1, 14-8-80; Deer. 
B-5, 15- 8- 80) The division of both formal and actual power between 
these three groups (and within them) remains to this day rather 
opaque and apparently changeable. 
M any of those released in June were re-arrested pursuant to a 
decree of 8 September (Deer. B- 9) providing for a Special Tribunal 
("Bijzonder Gerechtshof'') to deal with corruption charges ; severe 
criminal penalties had been added and a number of lesser changes 
made in the text of the draft decree mentioned above. 
The first trial before 
November, leading (on 19 
the Special Tribunal took place on 5 
November) to one acquittal and two 
convicticns . On l3 and 14 November the trial of those involved in 
the "Ormskerk coup" took place before an ordinary criminal court, 
and all but one accused were convicted, two in absentia, on 20 
November. (In connecticn with the anniversary of the coup of 25 
February 1980, those of the convicted persons who had withdrawn 
their appeals were pardoned.) On 24 November those involved in the 
"left coup" were indicted, and their trial before a court martial took 
place on 4 December; all of those accused were found guilty on ll 
December; a decree of 10 November had in the meantime made it 
possible to try civilians in such a case before a court martial. 
(Deer. C-33) 
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On lD December the second trial before the Special Tribunal 
began. Difficulties concerning the behaviour of the prosecution in 
this case and in several other pending cases led to the resignation 
of the members of the Tribunal on 12 December, and the appointment 
of a new Tribunal. Proceedings before the newly-constituted Tribu-
nal continue to take place. 
The foregoing extremely compressed sketch of some develcpments 
in Suriname during the past year forms the background against 
which allegations of violations of human rights must be understood. 
These allegations concern a number of features of the decree 
establishing the Special Tribunal, mistreatment of arrestees and 
detainees, procedural unfairness in the various proceedings, and 
infringements of the freedom of the press. Such allegations were the 
cause of some concern on the part of international organisations 
which address themselves to human rights questions - among them 
the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). 
Purpose and Limitations of the Mission 
The original purpose of the mission was tD observe the proceed-
ings before the Special Tribunal, tD gather related information, and 
to report tn the ICJ. It proved impossible, however, tD plan a trip 
to Suriname within the short period after the definitive date of any 
given trial became known. In consultation with the undersigned it 
was therefore decided that he should visit Suriname for a somewhat 
longer period than originally contemplated, and that his mission 
should be more broadly conceived as encompassing the human rights 
situation in Suriname in general. 
To avoid possible misunderstanding, the limitations of this 
report must be kept clearly in mind. It is possible for an outside 
observer, not previously especially knowledgeable with respect tD a 
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particular country or its legal system, to make a reasonable 
accurate assessment of the factual situation and the direction which 
develcpments are taking during the short period of his visit, so 
long as he limits himself to a few reasonably definite issues. It is 
not possible for such an observer to assess the political situation as 
a whole nor the prospects of lcnger-term change, and in any event 
such a general assessment was no part of the mission of the 
undersigned. Nor has he considered it his task tD pass any kind of 
general judgment on the state of affairs here reported, beyond that 
implied by the narrow, legal context of an interpretation of events 
in terms of internationally-recognised norms relating to minimum 
protections of human rights. Given the essentially factual nature of 
the mission, it has also not seemed necessary to deal in technical 
detail with the interpretation or applicability of any of the various 
sources of international legal obligation concerning respect for 
hum an rights: this is a report on a state of affairs, not a brief 
for any particular legal conclusion concerning any aspect of that 
state of affairs. 
Sources of Information ; Acknowledgments 
The undersigned observer was in Suriname for two weeks, from 
3 tD 17 February 1981. In that period he was able to observe one 
trial before the Special Tribunal ( Oostburg) and the delivery of the 
judgment in another case ( Thijm). The government of Suriname had 
been officially notified of his mission, and he received the assist-
ance of the National Information Service (Nationale Voorlichtings-
dienst), which among other things arranged for him to meet in 
privacy with several detained persons and with one of the prosecut-
ing officials (Auditeur-Fiscaal). The observer's presence in Suri-
name was announced both in the press and on radio and television. 
He had extensive discussions with and enjoyed many courtesies from 
Professor L. Th. Waaldijk, president of the Special Tribunal and 
presiding judge of the court martial in the "left coup" case, judge 
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of the Court of Justice (whose members also sit individually as trial 
judges), and dean of the Faculty of Law. He discussed the 
situation in Suriname with a large number of practicing attorneys 
i 
(including most of those involved as defence counsel in the corrup-
tion or coup trials mentioned above), with the head of the bar 
association, with other lawyers and law teachers, with prosecutors, 
judges, religious leaders, doctors, journalists, taxi drivers, fellow 
passengers on the bus, and others. He also collected a variety of 
documentary information including newspaper accounts of trials, 
judgments, legislation, books and pamphlets, etc. 
The information which follows derives in every instance from 
several sources, which the observer had every reason to regard as 
reliable, and which were checked against each other. In many 
instances initial versions of an event dif'fered from one another due 
to defective memory , differences of interpretation, etc. , and in such 
cases the sources of the differing versions were confronted with the 
discrepancies, until an agreed-upon version could be reached. A 
number of aspects of the situation are complex and controversial 
(e. g. the precise circumstances surrounding the resignation of the 
members of the Special Tribunal and the participation in and subse-
quent withdrawal of a foreign lawyer from the defence of the "left 
coup" case); fortunately, it has not been necessary to go into these 
matters in preparing the following report. In the opinion of the 
undersigned , the facts reported herein are not subject to any 
reasonable doubt (and in the few cases in which the truth is not 
indubitable, this will be appropriately indicated). 
The political situation in Suriname is tense and perceived as 
unpredictable. Much of the information gathered was given on the 
express condition that the source not be divulged, and in many 
other cases there seems to be no reason to subject any informant to 
any unnecessary risk of ·em barassment. Since in any case the 
essential situation was the subject of virtually unanimous agreement 
among the different sources of information, there would be no point 
in indicating with any further precision who said exactly what, 
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except occasionally i.n the case of offici.al r epresentatives of the 
government. 
It would, nevertheless , be ungrateful not to acknowledge here 
the advice and assistance received from Professor L. Th. Waaldijk. 
Mr Tj. Petzoldt of the National Information Service was also very 
helpful. The observer's gratitude to all the other people who gave 
him the benefit of their time, knowledge and insight is known to 
them, and can best be left in this general form. Of course, none of 
them bears any responsibility for the contents of this report. 
Findings 
The Three Problem Areas 
A coup d'etat and the ensuing military r egime necessarily 
entail the suspension of a number of important political rights, in 
any event of the rights to elect and to be elected. Generally, as in 
the case of Suriname, related political rights (such as the right to 
join together in political parties) are also affected. There is no 
doubt that these sort of rights are not in effect in Suriname at the 
present time, and there is no need to discuss this aspect of the 
situation further. 
Given the essential political situation just indicated, there are 
by general agreement among everyone with whom I spoke in Suriname 
three basic sorts of human rights problem areas which are of 
current importance: (l) the unsatisfactory position of the press; (2) 
the occurrence of arbitrary arrest and detention, and of mistreatment 
of detainees; (3) a variety of sorts of substantive and procedural 
unfairness involved in the anti-corruption proceedings before the 
Special Tribunal, and in the trial of the "left coup" case. 
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The Applicable Norms1 
The relevant provisions of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, to which Suriname is a party, are as follows: 
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Article 2 
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant under-
takes: 
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or free-
doms as herein recognized are violated shall have an 
effective remedy, nothwithstanding that the violation has 
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy 
shall have his right thereto determined by competent 
judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or 
by any other competent authority provided for by the 
legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities 
of judicial remedy; 
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall 
enforce such remedies when granted. 
Article 4 
1. In time of public emergency which threatens the 
life of the nation and the existence of which is officially 
proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant 
may take measures derogating from their obligations 
under the present Covenant to the extent strictly re-
quired by the exigencies of the situation, provided that 
such measures are not inconsistent with their other 
obligations under international law and do not involve 
discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, 
sex, language, religion or social origin. 
2. No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I 
and2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision. 
3. AJ,y State Party to the present Covenant availing 
itself of the right of derogation shall immediately inform 
the other States Parties to the present Covenant, through 
the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, of the provisions from which it has derogated 
and of the reasons by which it was actuated. A further 
communication shall be made, through the same inter-
mediary, on the date on which it terminates such deroga-
tion. 
Article 6 
I. Every human being has the inherent right to life. 
This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life. 
Article 7 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In par-
ticular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent 
to medical or scientific experimentation. · 
Article 9 
I. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of 
person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest 
or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty 
except on such grounds and in accordance with such 
procedure as are established by law. 
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the 
time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall 
be promptly informed of any charges against him .. 
3. ADyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge 
shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer 
authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall 
be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. 
It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting 
trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be 
subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other 
stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion 
arise, for execution of the judgement. 
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest 
or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before 
a court, in order that that court may decide without 
delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his 
release if the detention is not lawful. 
5. ADyone who has been the victim of unlawful 
arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to 
compensation. 
Article 10 
I. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be 
treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent 
dignity of the human person. 
2. (a) Accused persons shall, save in exceptional 
circumstances, be segregated fron\ convicted persons 
and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate 
to their status as unconvicted persons; · 
Article 14 
I. All persons shall be equal before the courts and 
tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge 
against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit 
at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public 
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law. 
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall 
have the right to be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law. 
3. In the determination of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following 
minimum guarantees, in full equality: 
- 9 -
- 10 -
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a lan-
guage which he understands of the nature and cause 
of the ,charge against him; 
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the pre-
paration of his defence and to communicate with counsel 
of his own choosing; 
(c) To be tried without undue delay; 
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself 
in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; 
to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of 
this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, 
in any case where the interests of justice so require, and 
without payment by him in any such case if he does not 
have sufficient means to pay for it; 
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses 
against him and to obtain the attendance and examina-
tion of witnesses -on his behalf under the same con-
ditions as witnesses against him; 
(J) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if 
he cannot understand or speak the language used in 
court; 
(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself 
or to confess guilt. 
5. Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right 
to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a 
higher tribunal according to law. 
Article 15 
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence 
on account of any act or omission which did not constitute 
a criminal offence, under national or international 
Jaw, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a 
heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was ap-
plicable at the time when the criminal offence was 
committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the 
offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of 
the lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby. 
2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial 
and punishment of any person for any act or omission 
which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal 
according to the general principles of law recognized 
by the community of nations. 
Article 19 
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions 
without interference. 
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in 
print, in the form of art, or through any other media 
of his choice. 
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in para-
graph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and 
responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain 
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided 
by law and are necessary: 
(a) For respect of the rights-or reputations of others; 
(b) For the protection of national security or of 
public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. 
Article 25 
Every citizen shall have the right and 'the opportunity, 
without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 
and without unreasonable restrictions: 
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives; 
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic 
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage 
and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free 
expression of the will of the electors; 
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, 
to public service in his country. 
Suriname is also a signatDry tD the ProtDcol accompanying this 
Covenant, so that if violations of the Covenant have not - after the 
available remedies in Suriname itself have been exhausted - been 
put right, individuals may appeal tD the Human Rights Committee. ( 2 ) 
Most of the above protections are recognised in domestic legal 
provisions as well, in the Constitution of the Republic of Suriname 
(suspended by Decree on 13 August 1980, as noted above), in the 
Codes of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure, and elsewhere. 
As provided in Article 4 of the Covenant, quoted above, 
defence of what otherwise would be a violation of a basic human 
right can, in appropriate circumstances, be found in the existe_nce 
of a "state of emergency". Without here entering intD a legal 
analysis of the question ( 3 ) the following observations concerning 
(2) 
(3) 
One Surinarnese court has found the Covenant not internally appli-
cable in Suriname, because of an alleged defect in the internal 
ratification procedure. (See the judgment in the first Special 
Tribunal case, Auditeur-Fiscaal v . Soek dew, 19 . 11.80) For present 
purposes , this question is irrelevant, since the Covenant is in any 
event binding at the international level. 
Suriname has not notified the Corrmi ttee, as required by Art. 4 of 
the Covenant. 
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such a defe nce of the situation in Suriname are in order: 
a. a state of emergency can justify o.therwise impermissible arrests 
and detentions, but not mistre a tme nt of those detained . 
Art. 4, p ar.2 of the Covenant) 
(See 
b. a state of e mergency could have nothing to do with the 
existence or functioning of the Special Tr ibunal, and it has in 
fact not been defended on such a basis . (See Art. 4, par. 1 -
c. 
"strictly require d by the exi gencies of the situation") It 
follows that the length and circumstances of detention of those 
detained for corrupticn can also not be justifie d by reference 
to a state of emergency. Retroactive crimes can in any event 
not be so justified. (See Art. 4, par. 2) 
while restrictions on the press can sometimes be justified by 
reference to a state of emergency, the same cannot be said of 
the way in which such restrictions are being carried out in 
Suriname. 
The conclusion from the above is, that apart from all other 
factual and legal difficulties which the state of emergency defence. 
would entail, its potential relevance to the topics covered in this 
report is very limited . 
The Freedom of the Press 
Apart from the general existence of a state of emergency, there 
is at the present no special legal restricticn on the freedom of the 
press. Nevertheless, it is clear that since 25 February 1980 the 
Surinamese tradition of a relatively free and critical press has 
suffered an abrupt and almost total reversal; how permanent this 
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c h ange is remains to be seen. (
4
) 
The situation now is this: without a ny legal authority, and 
in the absence of any possibility of review or redress, various 
civilian and military authorities take it upon t hemselves to issue 
orders to the editors of the various newspapers. (
5
) 
The press is also under instructions, of unclear legal proven-
ance, not to publish anything concerning the government, the 
military, etr:., without checking with the authorities concerne d. 
This "guideline" is so vague and all- encompassing that no-one knows 
what it applies to; nor is there anyone who can a uthoritahvel y 
interpret and apply i t, and it is clear from many different incide nts 
that the government is internally divided concerning t he extent and 
enforcement of restrictions on the press. Consequently, in any given 
situaticn the practical outr:ome of a conflict depends upon the 
unpredictable result of an internal balance of power, rather than 
upon the applicaticn of general norms by a body which has 
authority to do so. 
The absence of l egal norms and an authoritative body to apply 
them , and the consequent unpredicta ble and erratic interference with 
the press, are, however, not the worst of the situaticn . (6 ) The 
(4) 
(5) 
Apart from the situation of t he domestic press , there have been 
several i ncidents of interference with the news gathering act ivi -
tles of fore1gn reporters . It was not possible in the short time 
available to ascertain the facts in these cases nor to assess the 
merits of the Surinamese authorities' allegations of irresponsible 
behav1our on the part of the journalists concerned. 
While the undersigned observer was in Suriname, the Under-Minister 
of Police ordered all newspapers to print a rectification of an 
article which had appeared in one of them , and which concerned the 
activities of two other ministries. In this case, none of the 
papers complied, although the "offending" paper did publish an 
artlcle reflecting an "agreed-upon" version of the incident con-
cerned . 
(6) Indeed , some informmts said that t hey prefer such an unregulated 
lnterference to a foiml.lly instituted system of censorship, on the 
theory that the latter would be harder to get rid of once the 
poli t ical situation has returned to noiml. l . 
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worst is that, within such an unregulated state of aft'airs, the 
various members of the government carry out their own personal 
views concerning what ought not to be publishes, apparently without 
regard to the contrary views of others, and in a very heavy-handed 
way. Members of the NMR, in particular, have taken it upon 
themselves to order editors to be arrested by the Military Police and 
held for periods varying from a few hours to several days; while 
held, the editors have occasionally been subjected to abusive treat-
ment (hitting and kicking), sometimes dealt out by a member of the 
NMR itself. The experience is particularly intimidating because of 
its unpredicability and the l ack of any legal protection against or 
redress for arbitrary detention or mistreatment: one is simply at 
the mercy of the individual who has taken it upon himself to have 
one locked up. I n most cases the detention seems also to be 
accompanied by long and abusive harangues by those responsible for 
it, and an absence of any opportunity for the editor concerned to 
discuss, explain or defend the incident giving rise to it. Since this 
sort of anarchic intimidation of the press has taken place quite 
frequently in recent months (at least one editor. having experienced 
it several times in quick succession), the consequences for the 
effective freedom of the press have been, and are, very serious. 
The local press is threatened with becoming little more ·than a 
distribution system for government: press releases. M any people with 
whom the undersigned spoke in Suriname consider the intimidation of 
the press the most serious hum an rights problem which · is at the 
moment taking place. ( 7 ) 
Arbitrary Arrest and Detention, and the Mistreatment of Detainees 
( 7) 
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During the course of the past year considerable numbers of 
There have apparently been recent efforts within the government, so 
far successfully resisted by other insiders, to create a National 
Cormunicat ions Counci 1 (National e Cormunicat ieraad), v.hich in one 
form or another would exercise centralised control over all media 
of cormunication. Time and opportunity were lacking to. ascertain 
the truth concerning this question. 
people have been arbitrarily arrested (that is, without any r eason-
able, let alone legal, ground). They have been detained frequently 
for long periods in the absence of any l egal warrant. Much of this 
took place in connection with or at the time of political turmoil 
(after 25 February and at the time of the two alleged counter-coups ) 
and is in that context understandable whilst remaining unjustifiable 
(especially as far as the lenght of detention is concerned) . At 
present, futhermore, the problem of arrest or detention without legal 









to have subsided. Although 
persons detained without legal 
warrant came to this observer's attention, it was not possible to 
verify them. What is, however, a serious ground for concern is the 
apparent absence of any effective legal protection against arbitrary 
arrest and detention should it occur: it is this sort of insecurity, 
rather than any present abuse, which gives rise to the high level of 
anxiety which is such a palpable aspect of everyday experience in 
Suriname today. 
The problem of mistreatment of those detained is more complex 
and troubling. It resolves into four rough categories: a) serious 
physical mistreatment (with serious medical consequences); b) 
abusive and intimidating interrogation; c) "normal" police brutaly; 
and d) organized and systematic police brutality. 
Shortly after the coup of 25 February 1980, at the time of the 
"Ormskerk-coup" attempt until October or November, a disturbing 
number of cases of very serious physical mistreatment, sometimes 
bordering on torture, and occasionally entailing permanent injury or 
death, have occurred. Several cases are well-documented, and there 
can be no doubt that a good deal of this sor t of serious mistreat-
ment has taken place over the past year. There can also be no 
doubt that leading figures in the military have been directly 
involved, either personally or in the sense that the events took 
place with their knowledge and apparent consent, and in any case 
under their responsibility. There seems to have been no pattern i n 
these cases. Some involved persons thought guilty of ordinary 
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crimes, both serious and trivial. Others involved some (but by no 
me ans all) of the prominent former politic i ans detained in connection 
with corruption charges. Others involved persons protesting against 
t he maltreatment they or others h ad suffered (even when such 
protests were made without drawing public attention to t he i ncident), 
while other cases of suc h protests not only went unsanctioned, but 
appeared tn secure some measure of redress. Some cases appear to 
have involved purely personal vendettas of i ndividual members of 
t he NMR. 
accidental. 
An d some cases seem tn h ave been more or less 
For the moment, this sort of serious mistreatment seems 
to belong to the past, although, as in the case of arbitrary arrest 
and detention, the absence of any effective legal security or redress 
fosters a good deal of worry with respect tn the future. The 
apparent immunity of those whose culpability is evident from any 
sort of l e gal or even informal sanction contributes to the general 
atmosphere of lawlessness which one encounters on every hand, and 
which (or so it seems tn an outsider ) is one of the greatest political 
liabilities of the current regi me . 
do not like feeling threatened. 
People, tn put t he matter bluntly, 
Many cases of abusive and intimidating interrogation (involv-
ing such u nrefined me thods as bright lig hts, long hours on hard 
benches, shouting, threats , and other forms of intimidation) have 
undoubtedly taken place in the recent past. Partly this is a 
consequence of the use of the military Police for ordinary police 
work for which they are not trained, or the assumption of prosec u-
torial roles by some members of t he NMR. Evidence concerning such 
interrogation practices has been presented in several trials without 
leading to excl usion of the testimony (or even to a serious j udicial 
examination of the allegations) or to any other sanction against the 
offending inter rogators. This problem does not seem tn be of 
currently serious dimensions. 
"Normal" police brutality is a feature of all known police 
systems , a nd t herefore also of t he police in Suriname. Before the 
coup of 25 February 1980, however , the police had an excellent 
reputation for professionalism, and brutality (while certainly not 
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unknow n) was neither openl y nor implicitly tolerated by police 
authorities or the public prosecutors - or so one is told by persons 
in a position to know. I heard no compl aints with r espect to t he 
ordinary police relatin g to the year since the coup . The problem of 
police brutality concerns the Military Police who , as noted above , 
have since 22 August 1980 been given .the powers of t he ordinary 
police with respect tn ordinary criminal offences. Since they are 
not trained for this sort of work, and the restraints which it 
requires are foreign to them, a good deal of unnecessarily heavy-
handed, stigmatizing and i ntimidating behaviour accompanies t heir 
activities. They operate, also, in the atmosphere of lawlessness 
which members of the NMR have created and which their repeated 
example has ser ved to perpetuate. When NMR mem bers a llow them -
selves to be televised in the act of beating detained persons, when 
they oste ntatiously parade their contempt for the law and . for normal 
pr ocesses of government, it is onl y to be expected that ordinary 
military police will draw the conclusion that the norma l r ules of 
civilized behaviour do not apply to those in uniform. They 
apparently get swept up in the general Wild West spirit whic h those 
responsible 
foster. (8 ) 
for governing Suriname have created and continued to 
A certain restraint and respect for orderly process by 
t hose at the .top, and t he existence of clear and effective c h a nnel 
for redress in cases of abuse - and , probabl y , the withdrawal of 
the military police from ordinary police work are essential 
preconditions, it would seem, if an end is to be put to the current 
unnecessary level of police brutality. (The few cases in which 
those responsible fo r mistreatme nt of detainees have been disciplined 
were the result of this sort of " normal" police brutality which got 
out of hand and led to serious injuries. 
effective legal r emedies applies here, too.) 
But the general absence of 
Finally, and at the moment most disturbing , is the phenomenon 
of organized, system a tic police brutality . In the Military Police 
headquarters at Fort Zeelandia (and perhaps e lsewhere ) , ordinary 
(8) Some of t hi s is almosr arrusing - as, for example , th e wi delv 
reponed incidents of refusal by soldiers to comply with ordinar; 
traffic rule s , t o follow directions of traffic police, etc . 
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criminals are daily and routinely beaten and whipped. This 
apparently takes place with such regul arity and consistency, and 
makes so much noise, that it is simply impossible that the respon-
sible officers do not know and implicitly approve of i t - if, indeed, 
they do not explicitly authorize i t; indeed, the difference between 
implicit and explicit authorization seems irrelevant in such a case. 
Organized police brutality of this sort is definitely not a problem of 
the past. Nor does there appear to be any effective legal or other 
redress available at the present. And the victims enjoy t he benefit 
of far less attention "than those accused of subversion or corruption. 
The basic facts concerning all of the above forms of mistreat-
ment are widely known in Suriname. They are not, however, 
reported in the newspapers - for obvious reasons (see above). One 
cannot help but think t hat many of the worst excesses would not 
have occurred, and that the guilty would more likely have been 
sanctioned, " had the press been freer in this respect. Greater 
freedom of public criticism would also benefit the gover,-nment itself, 
since it would lead to more restraint with respect to that sort of 
v:iolent and lawless behaviour which - if one can draw inferences 
from what one overhears on street corners and in shops and buses, 
as well as from more profess:ional sources - is the greatest single 
source of popular resentment and the greatest single political 
liability of the current regime. 
The Special Tribunal 
The creation of a Special Tribunal to deal with allegedly 
corrupt practices under the preceding regime has probably attracted 
more adverse attention from those concerned with human rights than 
the other matters dealt with above. Furthermore, some of that 
concern is simply misinformed (e. g. the supposed reversal of the 
burden of proof: this was a feature of the draft decree which, as 
noted, had an essentially civil character, but it is not a feature of 
the present decree). What is not misinformed tends to address itself 
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to one aspect of the decree - its retroactivity - without noting the 
important respects in which that violation of a fundamental principle 
could be , and in fact has been , substantially cured in practice; on 
the other hand, matters of more substantial practical importance 
have been more or less overlooked. The long and the short of the 
undersigned observer's conclusion is this: while the decree is in 
principle objectionable 
implementation has also 
in a number of respects, and while its 
been inconsistent with some basic human 
rights, the tendency of recent developments, and especially the way 
in which the 
considerable 
judges concerned are implementing the 
way towards curing the situation. As 
decree, go a 
a result, the 
Special Tribunal as it is currently operating cannot be considered to 
entail violations of human rights of the same order of importance as 
the subjects dealt with above. This general conclus:ion is shared by 
many well-informed people in Suriname. 
Article l of the decree establishing the Special Tribunal 
(Decree B- 9) defines corruption as behav:iour (a) which v:iolates 
"generally accepted ethical and moral norms i n the society, whether 
o:>:' not made punishable in the Criminal Code or any other law " , and 
(b) which also involves the direct or indirect use of an official 
position, or the use of a "special position in relation to the State" 
to encourage others (officials or not) to engage in such behaviour ; 
or which entails an attempt to profit from such behaviour, if (c) it 
appears from the behav:iour itself that it was consciously inconsis-
tent with the material interests of the state or the Surinamese 
(9) 
society. This provision both specifies the punishable behaviour 
and determines the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal; it also 
forms the basis for the requirements of the formal charge on which 
an accused stands trial. 
Article l is, as a definition of an offence, objectionable on its 
face in two respects: its retroactivity and its vagueness. Nor has 
any consideration come to the attention of the undersigned observe r 
which would tend to justify it. The objection to retroactive criminal 
(9) See appendix for the full text in Dutch. 
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provisions is naturally not overcome simply by pointing to behaviour 
which ought to have been punishable, since the principle would be 
an empty one if it forbade only that for which there is in any case 
no need. The suggestion that the Decree is (partly) of a discipli-
nary rather than a criminal character, while perhaps tenable with 
respect to the original draft of the decree, cannot be taken 
seriously in the light of the heavy punishments provided in the 
decree (and in fact handed down) and the other obviously criminal 
trappings of the entire procedure. It may be that civil, discipli-
nary, and criminal measures were called for; if so, they ought to 
have been kept separate - in substance, and probably in procedure 
as well. Nor, finally, does it appear that anything approaching 
the degree of extremity of circumstances (that is, conduct "criminal 
according to the general principles of law recognised by the 
community of nations" Art. 15, par. 2 of the covenant) which 
might possibly justify departing from the provisions of the existing 
criminal law of Suriname, existed or exists in that country. 
The retrcactivity and vagueness implicit in a concept of 
corruption not tied to the relevant provisions of existing law has, 
however, been considerably mitigated by the interpretation which the 
Special Tribunal has put on Article l. (See the 'l;hijm case, De w~ 
Tijd, 14.2.81) According to that interpretation, Article 1 is prima-
rily jurisdictional in character: it determines, that is, which of the 
violations of the ordinary criminal law qualify as "corruption" and 
therefore come within the competence of the Special Tribunal. In the 
vast majority of cases which come before the Tribunal, the norm 
whose violation is at issue will thus have to be found in existing 
law. The Decree permits departure from the principle of nulla poena 
sine lege only in "very exceptional circumstances" and only if "such 
serious and blameworthy behaviour is involved that every person can 
and must understand that such behaviour is not only impermissible 
but also highly deserving of punishment''. Such an interpretation 
appears to limit the retrcactivity and vagueness of Article 1 
practically speaking to near, if not beyond, the vanishing point. 
the Special Tribunal has, in short, demonstrated its sensitivity to 
the human rights problems posed by Article 1 of the Decree, and has 
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gone a long way towards finding an adequate solution. 
There do remain two related problems. The punishments 
provided by the decree are different from, and more serious than, 
those provided for in the provisions of odrinary criminal law which 
the Special Tribunal will invoke - under the above interpretation -
as a source of the norms to be applied. Up to now the Special 
Tribunal has not explicitly decided that the punishment provisions of 
the Decree likewise are to be read as limiting its own competence, 
but not in derogation of the maximum punishments provided for in 
the ordinary criminal provisions whose violation must be established; 
indeed, it seems to have suggested that such a parallel interpreta-
tion cannot be applied to the question of punishment. Unless and 
until the Tribunal does take this further step, a very objectionable 
form of retroactivity remains. Because up to now the relationship 
between the judgment in any given case and particular provisions of 
the ordinary criminal law has not been made explicit, it is hard to 
say whether retroactive punishments have in fact been applied. (lO) 
The second remaining problem relating to Article 1 concerns the 
adequacy of the charge upon which an accused stands trial. At the 
present time, the indictment invokes Article 1 and specifies the 
relevant facts; it provides no clear identification of the provisions 
of the criminal law whose violation will have ID be proved. It is 
presently the practice of the Tribunal to cite the relevant provisions 
at the outset of a trial. This situation obviously amounts ID a 
drastic limitation on the possibility of preparing an adequate 
defence, since only at the trial itself does it become clear exactly 
which legal norms will be considered applicable. It also entails a 
fundamental inequality between prosecution and defence, the former 
having months at its disposal for legal research and the collection 
of evidence deemed relevant ID the position which it plans ID take; 
(10) Such retroactivity has almost certainly occurred as far as fines 
are concerned. It is a pity that recovery of ill-gotten gains has 
been attempted via fines, and that use has not been made of the 
civil provisions of the Decree. The Decree provides for several 
objectionable punishments which have not, however, so far been 
imposed: banishment, solitary confinement, general confiscation of 
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the defence is forced tc do its legal "research" during the trial 
itself and more or less out of its head, as the implications of the 
norms which are then for the first time specifie d become apparent. 
It woul d seem that the Special Tribunal could e asily take steps tc 
put such a glaring and unnecessary sort of unfairness right. 
The problems connected with presenting an adequate defence 
were in the early days of the operation of the Special Tribunal very 
serious. The charges and accompanying dossiers were made avail-
able tc the defence only a few days before trial. Contact between 
the accused and his l awyer was also only permitted during those 
last few days: the prosecutcrs seem clearly tc have abused their 
power m refuse such contact, a power which ordinary prosecutcrs 
also possess but, it is 
criminal defendants thus 
said, practically never use. Ordinary 
have access tc counsel (ll) within a few 
hours of their arrest, whereas those detained pending a trial before 
the Special Tribunal have often had tc wait many months for their 
first contact with a l awyer. Furthermore, there were incidents of 
interference with the privacy of the contacts which did take place, 
and of interference with the right of an accused tc a free choice of 
his lawyer. Happily, all of these patent violations of elementary 
principles seem now tc be matters of histcry, except for the denial 
of access tc counsel in the early stages of detention. So far as can 
be ascertained, it remains the policy of the prosecution tc deny such 
contact; there are persons who have now been detained for over 
half a year without having once been allowed tc see a lawyer. The 
undersigned is unaware of any consideration which could possibly 
justii'y such a policy. 
The question of detention is itself one of the most serious 
objections tc the way in whic h the Decree has been implemented. In 
a normal criminal case the prosecumr can order pre-trial detention 
on a number of specific grounds and for a period of at most 120 
days; extensions must be ordered every 30 days, and the accused 
can be assisted by his l awyer at every extension; after 120 days 
(ll) This access is not just a rmtter of theory: Suriname appears to 
have a well-functioning system of appointed counsel. 
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two judicial extensions of 30 days each are possible; at all times 
the accused can request the court tc order his release. Under 
Article 25 of the Decree the criteria for detention are extremely 
vague ( "serious charges" and "the interests of the investigation or 
of public order or safety, or danger of flight"); an unlimited 
number of 30-day extensions can be ordered by an individual 
prosecutcr; and the only protection against abuse lies in the right 
tc petition the Special Tribunal for release. A number of persons 
(at present about 10) have now been held for far longer than would 
(12) 
have been possible in a normal criminal proceeding without 
several of the protections there afforded. Furthermore, in an 
earlier stage of the implementation of the Decree, the prosecutcrs 
systematically frustrated the hearing of petitions for release by the 
Tribunal. This seems no longer tc be the case, and the undersigned 
observer was given tc understand that the Tribunal is now increas-
ingly inclined tc take an active and critical role with respect tc the 
length of detention. 
All of the problems concerning the practical implementation of 
the Decree are greatly aggravated by the way in which the 
prosecumrial staff is organised. In Suriname' s ordinary criminal 
procedure the prosecutcr is a highly professional, quasi-judicial 
figure who receives special training and enjoys permanent tenure, 
and who serves in a hierarchically organised prosecutcrial apparatus 
with an internal professional ethic and prosecutcrial policy, and 
with effective controls upon the activities of its members. In 
serious cases the investigation is, furthermore, under the supervision 
of an investigating magistrate, who is a member of the judiciary 
serving on rotation. This highly judicialised prosecutcrial appara-
tus is an essential element of the so-called "inquisitcrial" mode of 
criminal procedure common in civil l aw countries and which Suriname 
has adopted; it is a necessary condition of the fairness of such a 
system. The single greatest cause for concern, so far as the 
conduct of prosecutions under the decree is concerned, is the 
(12) The inexperience of the prosecutorial staff is obviously no excuse 
for such a serious invasion of a basic freedom . 
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absence of such an apparatus. The three prosecutors enjoy equal 
rank, and they function independently of any established profes-
sional structure; the normal controls over their behaviour are 
absent; they have no consistent prosecutorial policy; there is no 
superior to whom individuals, lawyers or judges can complain if 
they act out of line. Furthermore, they are unqualified and 
inexperienced: one is a soldier with no legal training or exper-
ience; one a lawyer with no prosecutorial experience; and one a 
lawyer with a brief experience as a junior member of a prosecutorial 
staff. As a group and as individuals they 
reputation for judiciousness or competence. 
(13) 
do not enjoy a 
Nor do they enjoy 
the external appearance of quasi-judicial impartiality required of 
such officers, and the widespread belief that they are insufficiently 
resistant to extra-legal considerations is strengthened by the fact 




There are a number of prosecutors available in Suriname of 
long experience and sound professional reputation. Some were 
apparently objectionable to the military regime on political grounds, 
while others refused to have anything to do with prosecutions whose 
independence of military pressure and interference was not guaran-
teed and which involved such vague and retroactive charges. 
03) It ought to be pointed out that one widely heard objection to their 
lack of professional competence is that many cases of serious 
corruption are alleged to be slipping through their fingers. For 
months, the proceedings before the Special Tribunal were in a 
number of respects frustrated by the failure of the prosecution to 
produce the required dossiers on time. The assignment of investiga-
tory work to the military police also entails incompetent and 
inefficient preparation of cases. 
(14) The appointment of the prosecutors, furthennore, is by the Minister 
of Justice in consultation with the military authorities. (See 
Decree B-9, art. 19.1.) The appearance that non-judicial considera-
tions play a part in the prosecution of corruption cases is also 
strengthened by the provision that persons arrested in the state of 
emergency by the military authorities on suspicion of corrupt ion 
can only be released if all three prosecutors so decide; it is not 
clear to what extent this provision suspends the requirement of 
extension every 30 days or affects the power of the Special 
Tribunal to order release upon petition. (See Decree B-9, art. 83) 
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Especially in light of the already noted adverse effects of that last 
factor on the procedural fairness of proceedings before the Special 
Tribunal, and of the sensitive position of the prosecutors with 
respect to such critical matters as detention, contact between detain-
ees and their lawyers, etc. , the present state of affairs with respect 
to the prosecutorial apparatus is very unsatisfactory. There is also 
no apparent excuse for it, nor any reason why it could not easily 
(15) 
be set right. 
A third set of objection to the activities of the Special 
Tribunal concerns the membership of the Tribunal itself. The 
problem here is not so much that deviations from impartiality and 
judiciousness are alleged to have occurred as rather that the 
conditions for confidence that such deviations will not take place 
are lac king. The English say that "justice must not only be done, 
it must manifestly be seen to be done", and it is with respect to the 
latter requirement of fair procedure that there is well-founded 
ground for concern. (l6 ) 
05) That the possibility of prosecut orial arbitrariness has also 
entailed actual arbitrariness is also plain. The lack of a 
prosecutorial policy has led to cases of apparent arbitrariness in 
the selection of cases for prosecution. When one detainee asked 
the military member of the prosecutorial trio (who until very 
recently is said to have handled all extensions of detention) how 
long he could expect to be detained, he was answered in a raised 
voice: ".l decide how long the investigation takes!" The pressure 
to "cooperate" which inevitably follows from such unbridled power 
to detain - especially when detainees may not have contact with 
lawyers - is one of the more important objections to such a state 
of affairs. Stories of false confessions made to speed up the 
process, or to avoid mistreatment, abound. 
(16) No suggestion is made that fair trials are impossible, or that the 
trials to date were not substantially fair. Conviction in any case 
is not a foregone conclusion, and there have in fact been some 
acquittals. lt was impossible for an observer to make any judgment 
conceming the strength of the evidence in these cases. It is 
widely alleged among lawyers whose opinion is entitled to respect 
that the various courts and tribunals have neglected evidence of 
coercion in extracting statements, have been unusually gullible 
with respect to prosecution witnesses, and have convicted on 
legally insufficient evidence. On the whole, such objections apply 
less to the Special Tribunal than to the two counter coup trials. 
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Unlike a normal court, the members of the Special Tribunal are 
specially appointed to that Tribunal by decree, and their tenure is 
limited to the duration of the Tribunal. Three of the five members 
are non-lawyers appointed by the military (and are themselves 
officers, in one case on active duty); only the presiding member is 
a professional judge. The fact that one of the prosecutors is also a 
prominent member of the military, the presence in the courtoom of 
large number of military police (in a police function, to be sure) 
and, from time to time, of members of the NMR - all this contributes 
to an atmosphere in which it is easy for the ordinary observer to 
wonder how independent the Tribunal really is from instructions from 
the military. A variety of at the least unfortunate incidents serves 
further to undermine confidence in the impartiality and independence 
of the Tribunal. One of its military members expressed his views 
concerning 
before his 
the guilt of members of the prior regime some months 
(17) 
appointment. The circumstances surrounding the 
resignation of the original members of the Tribunal in December 
make it appear that the military members, at least in that case, did 
follow instructions from outside (and, most probably, from the 
military member of the prosecutcrial staff) . That resignation itself 
- entailing, as it did, the departure from the Tribunal of three 
respected and experienced jurists (the military members were re-
appointed), who claimed with obvious justice that the Tribunal's 
effort tc run fair proceedings was being systematically frustrated by 
the behaviour of the prosecutors - inevitably casts a shadow on the 
work of their successors, even though the specific reasons for their 
resignation seem no longer tc obtain and their successors seem tc be 
succeeding as well as can be expected in the circumstances in 
affording accused persons a fair proceeding. 
The government has contributed in various ways to the atmos-
phere of suspicion and distrust surrounding the work of the Tribu-
nal. On a number of occasions it has expressed its view that the 
(17) It is said that at least one member of the prosecution has in the 
past announced his views on TV conceming the gui 1 t of accused 
persons, on the eve of their trial. 
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judiciary before arYJ after the coup of 25 February 1980 was too lax 
in dealing with corruption. In the decree of 13 August 1980 
announcing thr-' resumption of power by the military, for example, 
one of the considerations listed as justifying that step was an 
alleged "strong tendency in the policy of the judicial authorities to 
protect persons who apparently engaged in corrupt practices in the 
past" - an accusation which rests on nothing other than the applica-
tion of normal rules of fair criminal procedure (e. g. releasing 
persons against whom there is no evidence), so far as the under-
signed could ascertain. At the time of the resignation of the 
original members of the Tribunal the then Minister of Justice stated 
that the membership of the Tribunal needed in any case to be 
changed since the existing members had behaved as an ordinary 
court and thereby had ignored the "new legal needs" of the society 
(he was apparently dissatisfied with the judgment of acquittal in 
one case and the moderate punishments in two others). He also 
suggested that the Tribunal, in its efforts to speed up the proce-
dures, had been subjected to pressure from outside. All this sort of 
misleading and politically charged commentary naturally lends itself 
to a boomerang effect: when government officials first criticise one 
Tribunal, appoint its successor, and then appear tc be satisfied 
with the results, the public can easily draw the conclusion that the 
successor Tribunal has learned the lesson of its predecessor and now 
is not acting impartially as an "ordinary court". The long and the 
short of the matter, in any event, is that the Special Tribunal, as 
presently constituted, and given the background partially sketched 
above, does not appear to enjoy the confidence of the public, lay or 
professional. 
independent. 
Rightly or not, it is not regarded as reliable and 
It m ay be that its recent judgments severely restrict-
ing the scope of the Decree, and its increased activity with respect 
to detention and related questions, will help to restore general 
confidence in its work, and this is greatly to be desired. The 
situation of general distrust which the undersigned observer encoun-
tered was very disturbing. 
Most of the problems with the procedures before the Special 
Tribunal discussed so far could be entirely or substantially remedied 
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within the context of the Decree as it stands; indeed, the recent 
activities of the Tribunal have made great improvements in a number 
of important respects, as noted above. There remains one funda-
mental defect in the Decree which can only be remedied by legisla-
tion: the absence of a right of appeal. Indeed, many of the 
problems mentioned above (and especially the presence of a majority 
of lay members with apparent links via their military background to 
the prosecution and the government) would be substantially mitigated 
if an appeal were possible to the Court of Justice (which hears ap-
peals in ordinary criminal cases, and also from courts martial 
which, like the Special Tribunal, entail lay judges). The provision 
for a petition for pardon to the President and the military authori-
ties is an obv:iously insufficient means for "correcting" judgments of 
the Tribunal, despite the suggestion to that effect in the memoran-
. (18) dum accompanylng the Decree. 
The Court Martial of Those Allegedly Involved in the "Left" Coup 
Many complaints concerning the prosecution and conviction of 
this case came to the attention of the observer. These concerned the 
conditions of detention, mistreatment, extraction of statements by 
violence and threats; the intimidating atmosphere of the trial itself; 
the obstruction of defence counsel; the insufficiency and ( alle-
gedly) patent unreliability of the evidence of guilt; the trial of 
civilians before a court martial (pursuant to Decree C-33, 10.ll.80); 
etc. Since the case is still sub judice on appeal, it seems better 
not to consider it in detail here. 
It seems clearly established that the military authorities 
attempted in var:ious ways (so far, unsuccessfully) to prevent a 
(18) The suggestion that the Decree contemplates a sort of "summry 
justice" and that appeals would lead to intolerable delays, is 
unacceptable on its face as a justification for the denial of a 
fundamental human right. It is furthermore almost humorous in 
light of the extraordinary delays which the tempo of the prosecu-
tion has led to. 
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review of the convictions in this case on appeal. Both threats or 
violence and promises of pardon were employed in this connection. 
(On 5 M arch 1981, all of those convicted in this case were amnestied 
by decree.) 
Summary and Conclusions 
The following would seem to be the most serious problems 
concerning human rights which have arisen during the past year: 
a. Infringement of the freedom of the press by means of lawless, 
arbitrary intimidation. 
b. Mistreatment of detainees, some very seriously, without the 





Arbitrary arrests and long detention without adequate legal 
safeguards. 
Prevention of and interference with contact between detained 
persons and their lawyers. 
The absence of a proper prosecutorial structure in corruption 
cases. 
Inadequately specific charges in corruption cases. 
g. Inadequate time and oppotunity to orepare the defence ir: 
corruption cases. 
h. The absence of a r·ight of appeal in corruption cases. 
i. Problems concerning the appearance of independence and impar-
tiality of the members of the Special TribunaL 
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j. Retroactivity of the punishments in corruption cases. 
For reasons set forth earlier in this report, the situation with 
respect to most of these problems seems at the moment to be 
developing in a positive direction, and many violations of basic 
human rights happily belong to the past. Of current special 
importance are the position of the press, the occurrence of systematic 
police brutality, and several features of the corruption procedures 
before the Special Tribunal which that Tribunal has not yet reme-
died, or lacks the capacity to remedy. 
It should also be noted that in all of the trials to date - both 
those relating to the two alleged coup attempts and those before the 
Special Tribunal - the punishments imposed have been consistent 
with the humane tradition of Suriname's judiciary. The objections 
which the then Minister of Justice voiced against the lenient policy 
of the original membership of the Tribunal (a policy which sup-
posedly evidenced its lack of appreciation of the "new legal needs" 
of Suriname and therefore justified its replacement) do not appear to 
have had any adverse impact upon the independence and judgment of 
their successors. ( 19 ) 
On the other hand, it should be noted that such a relatively 
positive and optimistic overall assessment as emerges from this 
report does not conform to the perception of many persons with whom 
the undersigned observer spoke in Suriname. Partly the difference 
in perspective is to be explained in terms of the luxury of the 
position of an outsider, who because he is not himself involved or 
threatened, can afford to see events somewhat impassively and from 
a distance, and thus observes the continuing human rights problems 
of Suriname in an historical and comparative context in which they 
appear relatively less grave. 
(19) 
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The Tribunal has also not been helped in this regard by a well-con-
ceived punishment policy on the part of the prosecutors. Draconian 
demands histrionically presented have taken the place of a consis-
tent, intelligible and carefully presented policy. 
There is another difference, however, which is more important 
to the proper interpretation of the findings in this report. The 
period of this mission was, relative to most of the foregoing year, a 
very favourable one. Most excesses were, at least temporarily, a 
matter of the past, and the trend (especially in the case of the 
decisions and activities of the Special Tribunal) was in a distinctly 
positive direction. Many Surinamese observers, however, are acutely 
conscious of the political context within which such relatively 
positive short-term developments are to be placed. They are less 
concerned with the immediate situation than with the absence of 
legal or other guarantees against a return - perhaps even in a 
worse form - of the excesses of the past year. Arbitrary arrests 
and detention (with the exception of members of the press) are 
probably not now taking place; nor is serious mistreatment of 
detainees (except, of course, of "ordinary" criminals). But gj_ven the 
absence of any legal protection against such abuses - as evidenced, 
among other things, by the absence of any significant sanctions, 
civil, criminal or otherwise, against those notoriously guilty of such 
abuses in the recent past - everyone knows that he has only the 
present delicate political balance to thank for the relative security 
he now enjoys. 
An atmosphere of insecurity hangs over the country, an atmos-
phere of defencelessness which is itself a human rights problem of 
very serious dimensions. Only the government can do anything 
about this, by putting an end to official and semi-official anarchy, 
and hence to the stitling atmosphere which it fosters, and by 
making clear that a permanent end has come to violence and 
lawlessness, and that those involved, 1·1hatever their rank, will be 
made to suffer the legal consequences. 
Groningen, 27 February 1981 
Professor John Griffiths 
Faculty of Law 
Uni vPrsity of Groningen 







REPU:CLIER SURIN AME 
DECREETB·9 
No. 72 
D E C R E E T van 8 septembcr 1980 houdcnde de instclling 
van ecn spcciaal bercchtin!Jscollcge (Decreet Bijzondere Rechtsple· 
gin g). 
DE PRESIDENT VAN DE REPUBLIEK SURINAME, 
In overweging genomen hebbende: 
dat de buitengewone omstandigheid waarin Suriname 
sedert 25 februari 1980 is komen te verkeren het dringend 
noodzakelijk maakt om ter vo1doening aan de ontstane rechts-
hoef'ten de mogelijkheid te scheppen om personen, die zich te 
rekenen van 1 januari 1970 in Suriname, in strijd met de 
be1angen van de Surinaamse gemeenschap hebben gedragen, en 
op ethisch en/of moree1 onverantwoorde WlJZe gebruik hebben 
gemaakt van machts- en/of ge1dmidde1en van de Staat en/of de 
Surinaamse gemeenschap, ten aanzien van hun persoon en hun 
vermogen aan bijzondere m aatrege1en te onderwerpen en tevens 
bijzondere rege1en te stellen met betrekking tot hun inbewaring-
stelling en hun vrijheidsbeneming; 
dat deze maatrege1en mede de strekking hebben de rechts-
zekerheid en de rechtsveiligheid te bevorderen; 
Heeft, in bezamenlijk over1eg met de Raad van Ministers 
en het Militair Gezag, bes1oten: 
TITEL I 
Van de op1egging van bijzondere maatrege1en 
Artike1 1 
l. Aan personen, die op het tijdstip van het inwerking 
treden van dit decreet de 1eeftijd van achttien jaren hebben 
bereikt en te rekenen van 1 januari 1970 zich in Suriname 
hebben schu1dig gemaakt aan gedragingen die indruisen tegen 
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algemeen aanvaarde ethische en morele normen in de samen-
leving, welke gedragingen al dan niet strafbaar zijn gesteld 
in het Wetboek van Strafrecht of in de enige andere wet en 
daarbij - tijdens de men geschapen feitelijke tDestand - hetzij 
gebruik hebben gemaakt van hun positie binnen het Staatsappa-
raat hetzij als derden gebruik hebben gemaakt van personen 
met een deel van de Staatstaak belast, hetzij gebruikmakende 
van hun bijzondere positie jegens de Staat landsdienaren na-
tuurlijke personen of rechtspersonen hebben aangezet tot zoda-
nige gedragingen, zulks al dan niet met het doel zichzelf of 
anderen te bevoordelen, hetzij voordeel hebben getrokken of 
getracht hebben te trekken uit gedragingen van personen, als 
hiervoren omschreven, kunnen, indien ZlJ op grond van hun 
handelen of nalaten geacht moeten warden zich desbewust te 
hebben gedragen in strijd met de materiele belangen van de 
Staat en/of de Surinaamse gemeenschap of desbewust afbreuk te 
hebben gedaan aan deze belangen, bij uitspraak van een bij 
dit decreet in te stellen Bijzonder Gerechtshof als schuldig aan 
corruptie bijzondere maatregelen warden opgelegd. 
*** 


